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ABSTRACT
This article examines whether the assumption of perfect competition in the U.S. dairy
industry biases the findings of economic impacts of generic dairy advertising. An imperfect
competition model based on an approach similar to that of Appelbaurn is developed and
used to evaluate generic milk advertising. The results are compared with a perfect com-
petition model. The findings indicate positive price and quantity impacts due to generic
advertising. The differences in magnitude of impacts between the two models are small,
suggesting that the assumption of perfect competition for U.S. dairy models is plausible.
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Almost all previous models used to evaluate
the economic impacts of commodity promo-
tion programs have assumed perfect competi-
tion in the market. However, this may not be
a realistic assumption for many commodities.
Market power likely exists both on the buying
and selling sides of the market. For example,
farmers, through their cooperatives, may exert
a degree of selling power over processors buy-
ing agricultural commodities. Alternatively,
processors may have some buying power rel-
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ative to farmers or cooperatives, and/or may
have some selling power over buyers of the
processed products.
The existence of market power may give
biased results if traditional perfect competition
models are used to evaluate economic impacts
of promotion programs. This is an important
issue because nearly all previous studies have
assumed perfect competition. Two exceptions
include a study of generic milk promotion in
Japan (Suzuki et al.) and an analysis of generic
beef advertising in Canada and the United
States (Cranfield and Goddard).
The purpose of the current research is to
determine whether the assumption of perfect
competition in the U.S. dairy industry biases
the findings of economic impacts of generic
dairy advertising in the United States. A sec-
ondary objective is to measure the impact of
generic milk advertising on dairy markets at
the national level. Two models of the U.S.
dairy industry are used to simulate the impacts
of generic dairy advertising: (a) an imperfect
competition model, and (b) a perfect compe-316 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1997
tition model. The imperfect competition model
endogenizes the degree of market competition
using an approach similar to that of Appel-
baum, which is based on the assumption that
dairy cooperatives maximize total revenue by
equating “perceived” marginal revenue from
fluid and manufacturing milk markets. Using
quarterly data from 1975 through 1995, an
econometric model of milk supply with fluid
and manufacturing milk demand was estimat-
ed and used to simulate the impacts of milk
advertising on prices and quantities. The per-
fect competition model treats the price pre-
miums obtained by cooperatives through bar-
gaining power as exogenous. A comparison of
simulation results of the two models based on
alternative advertising scenarios provides in-
formation on the potential magnitude of bias
from the exogenous Class I premium model.
Conceptual Model
The underlying assumption of the imperfect
competition model stipulates that the role of
dairy cooperatives, acting as consignment
milk sellers, is to allocate their members’ raw
milk supply to fluid (or Class I, as it will be
referred to here) and manufacturing markets 1
to maximize total milk sales revenue. For most
dairy farmers in the United States, the manu-
facturing milk price is equal to the Basic For-
mula Price (or the Minnesota-Wisconsin price
before 1995). Therefore, the manufacturing
milk price is assumed to be exogenous for
1Federal and state milk marketing orders use a sys-
tem of classified pricing to price raw milk according
to how it is utilized. Milk used in the most price-elastic
products (e.g., butter) receives the Class III price,
which is equal to the Basic Formula Price determined
through market conditions in the surplus manufactur-
ing (Grade B) milk area of the U,S. (Wisconsin and
Minnesota). Milk used in the most price-inelastic fluid
products receives the Class I price, which is equal to
the Class III price plus a fixed fluid differential, and
varies with distance from the Upper Midwest. Most
federal milk marketing orders now utilize four product
classes, with Class I being fluid products, Class II be-
ing soft dairy products, Class III being mostly hard
dairy products, and Class IIIa being nonfat, dry milk.
For simplicity, a two-class system was used in this
study, with Classes II, III, and IIIa considered a single
manufacturing milk class paid the Basic Formula Price.
dairy cooperatives’ decisions on milk alloca-
tion. With this assumption, the ith coopera-
tive’s sales-maximizing problem can be ex-
pressed as:
(1) Max RI = P~q} + P.(q’ – q}),
St.:
(2) Q = Wf)?




where Ri is the ith cooperative’s milk sales
revenue, P~ is Class I milk price, P. is man-
ufacturing milk price, q} is the ith coopera-
tive’s Class I milk marketing, q’ is milk quan-
tity sent from member farmers, and {X,+,qj} is
the sum of all other fluid milk marketing by
cooperatives. Equation (3) indicates the ith co-
operative’s conjecture of the other coopera-
tives’ aggregate reaction function, i.e., how
the cooperative believes rivals will respond to
a change in Class I milk supply level.
The Lagrangian function for this problem
is specified as:





The first-order conditions are:
(6) aLidPf = q; – cl(aQ,ldPf) = 09
(7) i)LldQf = N + -y = 0,
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Taking Pm and q’ as given, equations (6), (7),
and (9) can be solved for u, resulting in:
(10) a = –y = –~ = q}/(dQfM’f).
Substituting (10) into (8) yields:
The term {d 2,*, qj/dq} = r 1} (conjectural vari-
ation) is the derivative of equation (3), and the
term { 1 + d Xj.l @/dq} = dQt/~qj = k’} (1 +
conjectural variation) is Varian’s k (Varian).
The first-order condition implies that the milk
sales revenue is maximized by equating “per-
ceived” marginal revenues from Class I and
manufacturing milk.
Using the conjectural elasticity, 6 = (~Q/
dq}Xqj/Qf) (i.e., Varian’s k expressed in the
elasticity term), equation (11) can be ex-
pressed as:
(12) P~ + 0 x Q1l(dQf/cWf) = p,.,
or
Pf(l – e/G) = P,,,,
where 6 is the price elasticity of Class I de-
mand in absolute value. Although Pf and 0 are
not the same for all cooperatives, equation
(12) is assumed to be valid for the national
market level if Pf and Oare translated into na-
tional average values.
Equation (12) can be rearranged as:
(13) e = c(Pf – f’,,yl’,.
Values for 6 can be estimated by substituting
estimated values for ~, and observations for P.,
and P~, into equation (13).
Although it is assumed that manufacturing
milk demand (Q.) and q’ are given for each
cooperative’s decision on milk allocation be-
tween markets in the short term, they are not
exogenous at the market level. Using the re-
lationship in (12), the imperfect competition
model of the U.S. dairy industry is represented
by the following six equations which contain
six endogenous variables:
(14) Q = .f(BF’, Pfeed,
(15) Qf = g(pf, ZNC,
Tj Dl, D2, D3, BST);
GAt, BAj, T Dl, D2,
D3, BST);
(16) Q,. = h(P,,,, INC, T, Dl, D2, D3, BST);
(17) P,(I – 0/4 = P,.;
(18) Q = Q~ + Q,,, + FUSE
and
(19) BP = (PfQ~ + P,,,Qm)l(Q – FUSE),
where the endogenous variables are aggregate
milk production (Q), farm blend price (BP),
Class I and manufacturing milk demand (Qf
and Q.), and Class I and manufacturing milk
prices (Pf and Pm). The exogenous variables
include feed price (Pje.~); time trend (T); in-
tercept dummy variables for seasonality and
for bovine somatotropin (bST) utilization (Dl,
D2, D3, and BST); disposable per capita in-
come (ZNC); generic and branded milk adver-
tising expenditures (GA~ and BA~); and on-farm
use of milk produced (FUSE).” Equation (14)
is the farm milk supply function, and equa-
tions (15) and (16) are the Class I and man-
ufacturing milk demand functions, respective-
ly. Equation (17) is the first-order condition
for optimal milk allocation between Class I
and manufacturing markets to maximize milk
sales. Equation (18) is an equilibrium condi-
tion requiring farm milk supply to be equal to
Class I and manufacturing processors’ milk
demand plus on-farm use of milk. Finally,
equation (19) is the formula for the blend
price, which is a weighted average price re-
ceived by farmers based on the class prices
and utilization of the milk supply.
The above model was compared to a con-
ventional perfect competition model where the
Class I price premium was treated as an ex-
ogenous variable. The conventional model
was the same as the above model, except that
equation (17) was replaced with the following:
(20) P~ = Pt. + DIFF,
where DZFF is the exogenous Class I price
differential.318 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1997
Table 1. Estimated Equations for U.S. Milk Supply, Fluid Demand, and Manufacturing De-
mand
Dependent Variables
Independent Milk Supply Fluid Demand Mfg. Demand
Variables in(Q) ln(Qf/N) ln(Q. IN)















































(8.22)Suzuki and Kaiser: Imperject Competition Dairy Models 319
Table 1. (Continued)
Dependent Variables
Independent Milk Supply Fluid Demand Mfg. Demand









MA(1) 0,428 0.482 0.872
(2,90) (3.86) (7.88)
Adjusted R2 0.94 0.90 0.86
D.W. 2.01 1.90 1.55
Note: Numbers in parentheses are r-values.
Estimated Model
The effective Class I price used in the esti-
mation is defined as the manufacturing milk
price (the Minnesota-Wisconsin price or the
Basic Formula Price), plus the minimum Class
I differential, plus any over-order payment.
There were no data for national over-order
payments for Class I milk, but the effective
Class I milk price (F’f) could be estimated by
solving the blend price equation for Pf:
(21) Pf = [BP(Q – FUSE) – PmQ,J1/QY
The term BP in equation (21) refers to the all-
milk price, which is a measure of the national
blend price including over-order payments.
Based on equation (21), the effective Class I
price was 5?4 higher than the actual Class I
price, on average, between 1975 and 1995.
The effective Class I price computed by equa-
tion (21) may be somewhat higher than the
true effective Class I price because the all-
milk price includes over-order payments for
Class II and Class III milk, as well as Class I
milk. However, over-order premiums for Class
II and Class III milk are usually much smaller
on a national basis than Class I premiums, and
therefore the potential upward bias in Pf from
equation (21 ) is likely small.
To check for potential bias, the effective
Class I price estimated from equation (21)
was compared with the “announced cooper-
ative Class I price, ” which includes over-or-
der Class I premiums, over the period 1976-
90 (Suzuki et al.). The average effective
Class I price computed using equation (21)
from 1976–95 was $14.32, while the average
announced cooperative Class I price was
$14.29. The 3@ difference, which represents
0.2% of the effective Class I price, implies
that the over-order premiums for Class II and
Class III milk at the national level are not
large on average, and consequently there is
probably little bias caused by using the com-
puted effective Class I price from the blend
price equation.
The estimated farm milk supply, Class I
demand, and manufacturing demand equa-
tions— corresponding to equations (14)
through (16)—are presented in table 1, while
all variable definitions and data sources are
listed in table 2. These equations were esti-
mated using two-stage least squares to correct
for potential simultaneity bias due to both
price and quantity being endogenous vari-
ables. Quarterly national data from 1975–95
were used to estimate the model.
The milk supply equation (Q) was estimat-320 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1997
Table 2. Definitions of Variables and Identi-

















Time trend variable, equal to 1
for 1975.1.
Intercept dummy variables for
lst, 2nd, and 3rd quarters of
year.
Effective Class I price per cwt
estimated using equation (21 ).
Intercept dummy variable for
bST utilization; equal to 1 for
1994.1–1995.3, equal to O oth-
erwise.
Manufacturing milk marketed
(bil. lbs.), computed as the milk
production minus on-farm use
minus fluid milk marketing.
First-order autoregressive error
term.
First-order moving average error
specification.
Milk production, bil. lbs.’
All-milk price per cwt divided
by the 1690 protein feed price
per ton.’
Fluid milk marketed, bil. lbs.a
Minnesota-Wisconsin price per
cwt.’
U.S. population, million per-
sons.b
Consumer price index for all
items, 1982–84 = 100,’
Disposable personal income per
capita, in $1 ,OOOs.d
Generic and branded fluid adver-
tising expenditures, deflated by
the media cost index, in
$1 ,000s.’
aUSDA/Economic Research Service, Dairy Sifuatkm and
Outlook Report.
bBureau of Economic Statistics, Inc., Handbook of Basic
Economic Statistics.
cUSDL/Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index
database.
~USDL/Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and
Earnings.
‘ Leading National Advertisers, Inc., Leading National
Advertisers and Class/Brand QTR $.
ed as a function of the milk-feed price ratio
(MF or BP/P~,,~), a time trend (T), and inter-
cept dummy variables for seasonality (D 1, D2,
and D3). It was assumed that farmers formu-
late price expectations based on past price ob-
servations; accordingly, a polynomial distrib-
uted lag was specified for the milk-feed price
ratio.z Several specifications for the lag struc-
ture were estimated, and the one that yielded
the best statistical fit in terms of the adjusted
coefficient of variation was selected. The sec-
ond-degree polynomial distributed lag im-
posed with both endpoints constrained to lie
close to zero and a six-quarter lag length fit
the data best. The time trend variable was in-
cluded as a proxy for improvements in tech-
nology over time. The intercept dummy vari-
able for bST utilization (BST) was dropped
from the model because it was not significant.
The Cochrane-Orcutt procedure and the mov-
ing average error specification were employed
to overcome significant first-order autocorre-
lation in the disturbance term. The computed
long-run price elasticity of milk supply was
0.591.
Per capita Class I milk demand3 (Q, /N)
was estimated as a function of the effective
Class I price (Pf), per capita income (ZiVC), a
time trend as a proxy for preference changes
(T), current and lagged fluid advertising ex-
penditures (branded BAf and generic GAf), and
intercept dummy variables for bST utilization
and seasonality (BST, and D1, D2, and D3).
All prices and income variables were deflated
by the consumer price index, and advertising
expenditures were deflated by the media price
index. A polynomial distributed lag was im-
posed to account for lagged generic fluid ad-
vertising effects, which is one of the most
common methods of modeling advertising im-
pacts (Forker and Ward). As with the previous
case, several lag specifications were estimated,
and the one that resulted in the best statistical
2The number of cows was not included as an ex-
planatory variable because long-run milk-feed price ef-
fects were incorporated by imposing a polynomial dis-
tributed lag.
sAll quantities in the model were measured on a
milk-fat equivalent basis to satisfy the equilibrium con-
ditions.Suzuki and Kaiser: Imperject Competition Dairy Models 321
Table 3. Estimated Quarterly Values for 6 fit in terms of the adjusted coefficient of vari-
ation was selected. The second-degree poly-
nomial distributed lag with both endpoints
constrained to lie close to zero and a five-quar-
ter lag length fit the data best.
Similar specifications for fluid milk adver-
tising have been used by many researchers
(e.g., Liu et al.; Suzuki et al.; Kaiser et al.).
Current branded fluid advertising expenditures
were found to be significant, but lagged ex-
penditures were not. The elasticities of Class
I demand with respect to price, income, and
branded fluid advertising were –0.158, 0.258,
and 0.0071, respectively. The estimated long-
run generic advertising elasticity was 0.048,
which was similar to Kinnucan and Forker’s
estimate of 0.051 in New York City, but larger
than Liu et al.’s estimate of 0.0175 for retail-
level national fluid demand. It is of interest
that the results show a negative and statisti-
cally significant impact of bST on Class I milk
demand,
Per capita manufacturing milk demand
(Q./N) was estimated as a function of the
manufacturing milk price (P.), per capita in-
come (ZNC), and intercept dummy variables
for bST utilization and seasonality (BS17 and
D1, D2, and D3).4 Again, all prices and in-
come were deflated by the consumer price in-
dex. A time trend as a proxy for preference
changes (T) was dropped from the model be-
cause it was not significant. Advertising vari-
ables were not included in this aggregate equa-
tion because of aggregation bias due to
summing up advertising expenditures for
many different dairy products. The estimated
elasticities of manufacturing demand with re-
spect to price and income were – 0.217 and
0.119, respectively.
Using equations (9) and (13), along with
the estimated price elasticity of Class I de-
mand, quarterly values for (3were derived and
are reported in table 3. While the estimated
elasticities are all statistically significant at the
Annual
Quarter Aver-



































































































































































































NA 4Government purchases of dairy products and
changes in commercial inventories were included with
commercial demand in the manufacturing milk demand
function because such purchases were counted as de-
mand for raw milk.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors, defined
by: Standard Error of the Estimated Price Elasticity of
Fluid Demand X (F’f– P.)/Pfl322 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1997
99% confidence level, they are close to zero,
with the average value for all years equaling
0.032. This result is lower than, but similar to,
findings of two other studies that have esti-
mated conjectural elasticities. Suzuki et al. es-
timated an average conjectural elasticity for
the U.S. dairy industry of 0.06 for the period
1977–90. Liu, Sun, and Kaiser estimated av-
erage fluid milk and manufactured product
conjectural elasticities for the U.S. dairy in-
dustry of 0.176 and 0.10, respectively, for the
period 1976–92. The magnitude of the conjec-
tural elasticities over this period suggests that
the U.S. dairy industry is relatively competi-
tive. Furthermore, the results indicate a slight
trend toward greater competition over time.
This trend is interesting since there have been
significant mergers and growth among major
dairy cooperatives in recent years. However,
as Suzuki et al. point out, increases in trans-
portation technology and in reserves of milk
outside the Upper Midwest have resulted in a
more competitive milk market nationally.
Model Validation and Advertising
Scenarios
The imperfect competition model, presented
by equations (14)–( 19), was completed by in-
troducing the estimated farm milk supply with
Class I and manufacturing demand equations
into equations (14)–( 16), and estimating val-
ues for 0 and ~into equation (17). When equa-
tion (20), P~ = P. + DIFF, was used instead
of equation (17), the perfect competition mod-
el was created. Again, the purpose of creating
the exogenous perfect competition model was
to compare the results of the two models in
terms of price and quantity impacts of generic
milk advertising. First, the validity of both
models was determined by dynamically sim-
ulating values for the endogenous variables
over a historical period (1976–95), given the
values for the exogenous variables using the
Gauss-Seidel technique. The mean absolute
percent errors5 were calculated for each model
5The formula used to calculate the mean absolute
percent error is: (l/n) XI(P – A)/Al X 100, where P is
the predicted value, and A is the actual value.
and were quite similar. Since the largest error
was roughly 6% (relatively small for a dynam-
ic simulation), both models were deemed rea-
sonable for this purpose.
To estimate the effectiveness of generic
milk advertising, four scenarios were simulat-
ed based on 10% and 5070 increases, and 50%
and 95?Z0decreases in generic fluid advertising
expenditures in every period from the third
quarter of 1976 through the third quarter of
1995. A fifth scenario was run with advertis-
ing levels set equal to historical levels in order
to provide a baseline for comparison to the
other four scenarios. The effectiveness of ad-
vertising was measured in terms of changes
(from the baseline scenario) in Class I and
manufacturing milk prices, and Class I and
manufacturing milk quantities associated with
the respective change in generic milk adver-
tising expenditures.
Results
The simulation results for the various scenar-
ios are summarized in table 4. The first col-
umn of numbers for each scenario gives the
percentage change in prices and quantities due
to a change in milk advertising expenditures,
averaged over the period 1976.3– 1995.3, gen-
erated by the imperfect competition model.
The second column of numbers for each sce-
nario provides identical information, except it
corresponds to the perfect competition model.
Not surprisingly, the largest discrepancy
between models was the predicted impact of
advertising on the Class I price. For example,
in the 50?Z0increase in milk advertising sce-
nario, the imperfect competition model pre-
dicted an increase in the Class I price of 12,5c
per cwt, while the perfect competition model
predicted an increase of 10.8@. In fact, for all
four scenarios, the imperfect competition
model consistently predicted a larger change
in the Class I price due to changes in adver-
tising. Therefore, the claim that the conven-
tional perfect competition model understates
the impact of advertising on the Class I price
appears to be confirmed in this empirical sim-
ulation. However, the difference in magnitudes
between models was small, indicating the biasSuzuki and Kaiser: Imper$ect Competition Dairy Models 323
Table 4. Estimated Quarterly Average Changes in Milk Prices and Quantities Associated with
Changes in Advertising Expenditures (1976.3–1995.3)
Changes from Baseline Level
Imperfect Perfect Imperfect Perfect
Item Competition Competition Competition Competition
Fluid Milk Price ($/cwt)












––- 509’o Increase Scenario ––- ––- 50V0 Decrease Scenario –––
0,125 0.108 –0.207 –0.179
(0.87) (0.75) (- 1,44) (-1.25)
0.233 0.235 –0.389 –0.395
(1.76) (1.78) (-2.94) (-2.97)
0.099 0.108 –0.164 –0.178
(0.87) (0.95) (-1 .44) (-1.58)
–0.039 –0.042 0,065 0.071
(-0,19) (-0.21) (0.32) (0.35)
––– IO% Increase Scenario ––– ––– 95% Decrease Scenario – ––
0.029 0.025 –0.839 –0.720
(0.20) (0.18) (-5.86) (–5.03)
0.054 0.055 –1,604 –1.620
(0.41) (0.42) (-12.11) (–12.23)
0.023 0.025 –0.664 –0.720
(0.20) (0.22) (-5.86) (–6.37)
–0.009 –0.010 0.271 0.296
(-0,04) (-0.05) (1.33) (1.45)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentage changes.
in previous models was likely small as well.
The two models do indicate roughly the same
level of advertising impact on Class I quanti-
ties. The imperfect competition model pre-
dicted a slightly lower advertising impact on
Class I quantities than the perfect competition
model.
The two models also generated differences
in terms of milk advertising impacts on the
manufacturing milk market. In the 50% in-
crease in milk advertising scenario, the imper-
fect competition model predicted a 9.9? per
cwt increase in the manufacturing price due to
changes in milk advertising, while the conven-
tional perfect competition model predicted a
10.8@ increase. Similarly, the imperfect com-
petition model predicted a O.19% decrease in
manufacturing milk quantities due to increased
milk advertising, compared with a 0.21% de-
crease projected by the conventional model.
Similar to the Class I market results, the actual
magnitude of differences between models was
relatively small.
The main methodological implication of
this study is that the extent of possible bias
caused by assuming perfect competition in the
dairy markets is rather small. The simulated
values of market variables from both models
were quite similar between the two models.
Moreover, since the conjectural elasticity has
been generally falling over time, indicating in-
creasing competition in the market, it appears
that the use of perfect competition models in
future analyses of the U.S. dairy industry may
be appropriate.
Clearly, from the results of both models,
generic milk advertising has had an impact on
the markets for both fluid and manufacturing
milk. For example, the imperfect competition
model predicted that a 50’% decrease in ge-
neric fluid milk advertising over the period
1976–95 would have resulted in an average324 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1997
decrease in the Class I price of 1.44% and an
average decrease in Class I volume of almost
3Y0. This means that reducing milk advertising
by 50% over this period would have resulted
in an average reduction in total Class I milk
revenue to farmers of 4.3%. This translates
into an annual loss in revenue of $322 million,
on average, from 1976–95, which is signifi-
cant considering the amount of the total check-
off program (including advertising for all
products, research and development, nutrition
education, and overhead) over this period av-
eraged just $206 million per year.
The model also indicated cross-commodity
impacts of fluid milk advertising on the man-
ufactured products market. For instance, a
50% decrease in fluid milk advertising would
have resulted in an average decrease of 1.4%
in the manufacturing milk price and a O.390
increase in manufacturing sales, because a de-
crease in Class I sales made more milk avail-
able for the manufacturing milk market. This
translated into a decrease in total manufactur-
ing milk revenue of 1.1%, on average, over
1976–95. Therefore, generic fluid milk adver-
tising over this period had positive impacts for
dairy farmers in both fluid and manufactured
product markets.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to determine
whether the assumption of perfect competition
in the U.S. dairy industry biases the findings
of economic impacts of generic dairy adver-
tising in the United States. Two models of the
U.S. dairy industry were developed and used
to simulate the impacts of generic dairy ad-
vertising: (a) an imperfect competition model,
and (b) a perfect competition model. The im-
perfect competition model endogenized the
degree of market competition using an ap-
proach similar to that of Appelbaum, The per-
fect competition model treated the price pre-
miums obtained by cooperatives through
bargaining power as exogenous.
The results indicate the perfect competition
model understated the impact of generic milk
advertising on the Class I price, and overstated
the advertising impacts on Class I quantity,
and on manufacturing milk price and quantity.
However, the differences in magnitude of im-
pacts between the two models were small.
Therefore, the empirical results suggest the ex-
tent of bias in previous exogenous Class I pre-
mium models was likely small as well. Like
virtually all previous studies, this research also
confirmed that generic fluid milk advertising
has had a positive impact on fluid and manu-
factured milk markets in the United States in
terms of increasing producer prices and Class
I volume.
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